research

Building autonomous systems that can be trusted — safe reinforcement learning, safety validation, and calibrated uncertainty for aviation, robotics, and clinical decision support.

Autonomous systems increasingly depend on learned components — perception models, control policies, and now foundation models. These components are capable but opaque: they fail in ways their designers did not anticipate, and they offer no native account of their own reliability. My research asks what it takes to deploy them where failure is not an option, in aviation and airspace operations, robots working around people, and clinical decision support.

The work follows four connected pillars: the geometric foundations that make guarantees tractable in the first place; learning policies that respect safety requirements even when those requirements are never fully specified; quantifying uncertainty so a system knows when it should not be trusted; and finding failures before deployment, efficiently enough to be practical. This agenda is supported by NSF, the FAA, and NASA.

Geometric Foundations for Trustworthy Learning

Optimal transport and structure-preserving generative models

Nearly every guarantee in the work that follows reduces to a question about probability distributions: how far apart are two agents' beliefs, how do you average them without destroying structure, how far may a policy move in a single update. Optimal transport answers these with a geometry rather than a heuristic. Treating policies and value estimates as distributions rather than points yields risk-sensitive value estimation, principled consensus among cooperating agents through Wasserstein barycenters, and trust-region updates that respect that geometry. A parallel line builds structure directly into generative dynamics models — metriplectic flow matching that respects dissipative physics, flow matching on manifolds, and temporal-logic guidance for constrained generation. The motivation is reliability rather than elegance: a learned dynamics model that violates conservation laws or drifts off the feasible set cannot support a safety argument downstream.

Safe and Constraint-Aware Reinforcement Learning

Policies that carry a safety argument, not just good average performance

Most work on safe reinforcement learning assumes the constraint is handed to you in closed form. In deployment it rarely is: the specification is partial, expressed in temporal logic, implied by human corrections, or buried in a dataset of demonstrations of unknown quality. My work learns the policy and the constraint together — inferring unknown temporal specifications during training, refining behavior from human feedback, and enforcing safety through learned Lyapunov–barrier certificates that come with stability guarantees. A recurring device is hierarchy: decomposing long-horizon tasks so that safety can be reasoned about at the level of abstraction where it is actually specified.

Uncertainty Quantification and Calibrated Confidence

Systems that know when they should not be trusted

Trustworthiness requires more than average accuracy: a deployed system needs a defensible account of its own uncertainty, and a controller should become more conservative exactly when its models are least reliable. Conformal prediction offers distribution-free, finite-sample coverage guarantees, but standard formulations assume flat, exchangeable data. I extend it to settings with real structure — hierarchical data with group-level effects, and predictions living on manifolds — while preserving coverage. A companion line turns disagreement among ensemble members into an online signal for adapting the safety margin of a model-predictive controller. Applications run from aviation autonomy to clinical decision support.

Safety Validation of Learning-Enabled Autonomous Systems

Finding the failures before deployment does

A learned controller can pass millions of random simulation trials and still fail catastrophically on the rare input that matters. Exhaustive verification is out of reach, and high-fidelity simulation is far too expensive to search with. I develop multi-fidelity falsification: methods that search broadly using cheap, approximate simulators and spend expensive high-fidelity evaluations only where a failure looks likely, with the fidelity level itself treated as a decision variable. Related work asks how much simulator fidelity is actually required to certify a given property, and develops stratified temporal logics for requirements that span scales. This thread underpins my NSF- and FAA-funded projects and was the subject of my AAAI New Faculty Highlights talk.

Funding

  • National Science Foundation — RII: Safety Validation of Autonomous Systems from Multiple Sources of Information, 2022–2024
    Single PI
  • Federal Aviation Administration — Safety Verification Framework for Learning-based Aviation Systems (SVF-LAS), 2021–2023
    Lead PI
  • NASA — Fault Diagnosis for Safety-Critical Autonomous Systems using Reinforcement Learning, 2021–2022
    Lead PI
  • National Science Foundation — NRT-AI: AWARE-AI, AWAREness for Sensing Humans Responsibly with AI, 2021–2026
    Senior Personnel, co-lead of the software track

A complete list of papers, filterable by theme, is on the publications page.